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Résumé / Abstract 
 
On présente un modèle d’exploitation d’une ressource naturelle dans lequel les ménages 
accordent une importance à la consommation relative, soit la différence entre leur 
consommation et celle de leur groupe de référence. On identifie deux dimensions de 
distorsion. Premièrement, il y a la distorsion dans le choix du niveau d’effort. Deuxièmement, 
il y a la distorsion dans le choix entre la consommation présente et la consommation dans le 
futur. En général, les ménages ont tendance à exploiter les ressources naturelles de facon 
excessive. Par conséquent, les stocks de ressources à l’état stationnaire sont plus petits que 
ceux qu’aurait choisis un planificateur central. On propose une règle de taxation qui assure les 
résultats optimaux. 
 





This paper presents a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are household's 
preferences depend on relative consumption levels. We identify two dimensions along which 
consumption externalities distort the efficient extraction of resources: (i) the static trade-off 
between consumption and effort, and (ii) the dynamic trade-off between current and future 
consumption. In general, households over-exploit the natural resource stocks, resulting in 
steady state stocks lower than the efficient stocks of resources that would be chosen by a 
benevolent central planner. We propose a tax mechanism to induce the first best outcome. 
 
Keywords: relative consumption; relative income hypothesis; permanent 
income hypothesis. 
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The assumption that preferences are independent across households is
standard in the economic literature, although it is not particularly appealing.
Indeed, social scientists and philosophers have long stressed the relevance
of status seeking as being an important characteristic of human behavior
(see Aristotle (1941, Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 10), Kant (1960, Chapter
6), Rawls (1971, Sections 80-82), Schoeck (1966)). In our discipline, the idea
that the overall level of satisfaction derived from a given level of consumption
depends not only on the consumption level itself but also on how it compares
to the consumption of other members of society, is not new. Though origins
of this proposition can be traced as far back as Smith (1759) and Veblen
(1899), it was not until the work of Duesenberry (1949) and Pollak (1976)
that the idea was subjected to systematic analysis. The subsequent literature
has often referred to this type of interdependence as “catching up with the
Joneses” as in Abel (1990), “keeping up with the Joneses” as in Gali (1994),
“status” as in Fisher and Hof (2000), “jealousy” as in Dupor and Liu (2003),
or “envy” as in Eaton and Eswaran (2003).
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that conﬁrms the import-
ance of preference interdependence. Clark and Oswald (1996), using a sample
of 5,000 British workers, ﬁnd that workers’ reported satisfaction levels are
inversely related to their comparison wage rates, supporting the hypothesis
of positional externalities. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) propose a model
of relative income to rationalize the striking rise in the employment of mar-
ried women in the U.S. during the past century. Using a sample of married
sisters, they ﬁnd that married women are 16 to 25 percent more likely to
work outside the home if their sisters’ husbands earn more than their own
husbands. Luttmer (2005) matches individual-level panel data on well-being
from the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households to census data on
local average earnings. After controlling for income and other own character-
istics, he ﬁnds that local average earnings have a signiﬁcantly negative eect
2on self-reported happiness1.
On the other hand, there is a vast literature on the over-exploitation of
natural resources, in which economists and other scientists have traditionally
focused in the “common property” characteristics of many resources. Gor-
don (1954) presents a lucid treatment of the economics of common property
resources. Hardin (1968) conveys the “tragedy of the commons” to the sci-
entiﬁc community. Smith (1968) focuses on the steady-state ine!ciency while
Plourde (1971), Brown (1974) and Smith (1975) explicitly consider models
that exhibit transitional dynamics. Brown (1974) points out that a harvest
tax, which must change over time as the stock level evolves, should be intro-
duced to correct for congestion externalities. Smith (1975) reviews the debate
on the cause of the extinction of many animal species in prehistoric time, and
assesses the role of “over-hunting” by primitive human societies. Kremer and
Morcom (2000) analyze multiplicity of equilibria in common property re-
sources. Considering the environment as an international common property,
Withagen and van der Ploeg (1991), Dockner and Long (1993), Copeland
and Taylor (1995), de Zeeuw and Mäler (1998) show that the environment is
over-exploited and analyze the role of coordination and governmental regu-
lation.
In this paper we connect these two streams of literature: envy and over-
exploitation of natural resources. Our goal is to explore the eects of rel-
ative consumption concerns on the process of resource extraction. Comple-
menting the traditional concerns of over-exploitation that results from the
common property feature of many natural resource stocks, our results high-
light an additional source of ine!ciency that leads to over-exploitation: envy.
We present a standard model of resource extraction where preferences are
1Beyond these studies, status concerns have been introduced to account for observed
departures from the neoclassical paradigm in the asset pricing literature (Abel (1990),
Gali (1994) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), the literature on labor market outcomes
(Akerlof and Yellen (1990), the consumption literature (van de Stadt et al. (1985), Kapteyn
et al. (1997), Alvarez-Cuadrado and Sutthiphisal (2006)), the experimental literature (Sol-
nick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005))
and the real business cycle literature (Ravn et al. (2006)).
3deﬁned over the individual’s consumption level, her eort and the compar-
ison of her consumption with that of other members of the community. We
identify two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the
e!cient extraction of resources. First, when eort is costly, envy distorts the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and eort. We call this
the static/steady-state distortion. Since status-seeking individuals overvalue
consumption, their willingness to exert eort in order to achieve additional
consumption is higher than the e!cient level. As a consequence of this they
over-exploit the resource, resulting in a steady-state stock that is lower than
the e!cient stock of resources chosen by a central planner. Second, even
when eort is costless, consumption externalities might distort the willing-
ness to shift consumption through time, resulting in an ine!cient path of
extraction. We call this the dynamic distortion.W ee x p l o r et h ec o n d i t i o n s
under which these two distortions arise and we show that there exists an
optimal tax scheme which induces the competitive agents to replicate the
choices of the planner. The tax rate is positive and, in general, time-varying.
We calibrate our model under widely used functional forms and ﬁnd that,
under consumption externalities, the competitive steady-state stock of re-
sources is less than two thirds of the e!cient stock. Moreover the welfare
costs associated with this over-exploitation are very large, close to one third
of the laissez-faire steady-state level of consumption. Finally we revisit two
important topics in the natural resource literature: amenities and extinction.
T h ei n t u i t i o nw ed e v e l o p e dw i t ho u rg e n e r a lm o d e lc a r r i e st h r o u g hi nt h e s e
special cases: over-exploitation arises even when the natural resource gener-
ates a variety of amenity services, and the possibility of extinction increases
with consumption externalities.
Our work is related to Fischer and Hof (2000) and Liu and Turnovsky
(2005). These authors explore the eects of relative consumption on the rate
of capital accumulation and growth. They show that, when labor is endogen-
ous, the concerns for relative consumption lead to the over-accumulation
of capital. In contrast, in our context, consumption externalities lead to the
4under-accumulation of the stock of natural resources. Our welfare results
are closely related to the recent literature that explores the determinants of
(self-reported) well-being such as Frank (1985), Easterlin (1995), Frey and
Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005). This literature highlights the importance
of interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of self-reported happiness.
Finally, in order to focus on the role of relative consumption, we decided
to abstract from the common property problem2. All the results we present
are derived under the assumption that the stocks of resources are privately
owned. This assumption allows us to clearly identify the speciﬁc distortions
associated with consumption externalities abstracting from other external
eects, such as the ones caused by congestion or common property.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model, com-
pares the decentralized and centrally planned solutions, explores the distor-
tions associated with envy and characterizes the optimal ﬁscal policy. Section
3 quantiﬁes the consequences of comparative consumption on the equilibrium
allocation of resources. Section 4 presents additional results under consump-
tion externalities: amenities and extinction. The conclusions are summarized
in Section 5, while the Appendix provides some technical details.
2 Consumption externalities and resource
extraction
2.1 Economic environment
Consider an economy populated by Q identical inﬁnitely-lived individu-
als. Each individual owns a resource stock, V, and has access to the following
harvesting function,
| = I(V>O) (1)
that satisﬁes IO A 0, IV A 0 and I(0>O)=I(V>0) = 0,w h e r eO is the
representative individual’s harvesting eort. The change in the stock at any
2See Long and Wang (2007) for a model of exploitation of a common property resource
under envy.
5point in time is the dierence between the natural growth rate of the resource,
J(V), and the amount harvested:
˙ V = J(V)  | (2)
where J(=) is a strictly concave function, with J(0) = 0 and J0(0) A 0.A s -
sume J(V) reaches a global maximum at VP A 0.W ec a l lVP the maximum-
sustainable-yield stock level. The quantity harvested is consumed and there-
fore denoting by f the consumption of the representative individual, f = |.
Let F denote the average per capita consumption in our economy, F =
XQ
l=1 fl@Q= Following Abel (1990) and Carroll et al. (1997), we assume that
the utility function of our representative individual depends not only on her
own level of consumption and eort, but also on the average consumption
level in the economy: X(f>F>O). This speciﬁcation captures the intuition that
lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence that places interpersonal
comparisons as a key determinant of individual well-being. We denote the
marginal utility of own consumption, average consumption and eort by X1,
X2 and XO, respectively. The level of utility achieved by our representative
individual is increasing in her own consumption but at a decreasing rate, X1 A
0 and X11 ? 0, and decreasing in eort, XO ? 0. In addition we assume that
the utility function is jointly concave on individual consumption and eort
with X1O  0, so the marginal utility of consumption decreases with eort.
The crucial aspect of our preference speciﬁcation concerns the externality
imposed by average consumption on the well-being of the individual agent.
In the terminology of Dupor and Liu (2003) our agents are jealous, i.e.,
X2 ? 0. Furthermore we impose the following restrictions on the consumption
externality for symmetric increases in individual and average consumption,
X1 +X2 A 0, X11 +X12 ? 0 and XO1 +XO2  0. These inequalities guarantee
that along a symmetric equilibrium, where f = F,d i r e c te ects (i.e., eects
through the individual’s own consumption), always dominate indirect eects
(i.e., eects through average consumption).
Finally, it is convenient to invert the harvesting function to get the “eort
6requirement” function
O = O(f>V) (3)
with Of A 0 and OV ? 0. Our speciﬁcation assumes that there are Q identical
stocks of resources that are privately owned and each individual internalizes
the eects of her harvesting choices on the evolution of her stock. Our goal
is to explore the eects of consumption externalities on the rate of depletion
of the stock of resources and therefore we choose to ignore the additional
external eect that would be introduced under the assumption of common
property of resources, which has been widely explored.
2.2 Model solution: decentralized versus centralized
exploitation
Each individual chooses consumption and eort in order to maximize







subject to her resource constraint, (2), the eort requirement function, (3)
and V(0) = V0. In a decentralized solution each individual ignores the eects
of her own consumption choices on average consumption and therefore takes
the path of F as given. Denoting by #
g the private shadow value of the
resource, the optimality conditions associated with this program, where the











































together with (2) and the transversality condition, lim
w<"#
gVgh3w =0 .E q u a -
tion (5) equates at the margin the utility of a unit of consumption, net of the
eort cost required to extract it, to the private shadow value of the resource.
Equation (6) is the standard intertemporal allocation condition that requires
7the equalization of the rate of return of consumption and the rate of return
of the unextracted resource, which consists of two terms: the marginal repro-
duction rate of the resource and the lower eo r tc o s tr e q u i r e dt oe x t r a c ti t
when it is marginally more abundant.
In contrast to the optimization problem of private agents, the central
planner acknowledges that each individual’s consumption choice creates dis-
tortions through its eects on average consumption. Therefore he perceives
the following utility speciﬁcation for the representative individual, X(f>f>O).
The planner chooses the levels of consumption and eort to maximize the
present value of the ﬂow of utility subject to (2), (3) and V(0) = V0.T h e


























XO (fs>f s>O(fs>Vs))OV (fs>Vs)
X1 + X2 + XOOf
(8)
together with (2) and the transversality condition, lim
w<"#
sVsh3w =0 .T h e
dierence between the two solutions arises because the planner internalizes
the negative impact of average consumption on individual welfare by ad-
justing the marginal utility of private consumption to take into account its
marginal social cost. In a general set-up, with endogenous consumption and
eort choices, consumption externalities can introduce distortions along two
margins; the trade-o between consumption and eo r ta ta n yg i v e nt i m e ,t h e
static distortion,a n dt h et r a d e - o  between consumption at dierent points in
time, the dynamic distortion. We will explore the eects of both distortions
along a symmetric equilibrium where f = F.3
3The optimality conditions presented in this section are necessary for an interior op-
timum path. Under well-behaved preferences and reproduction functions, these conditions
are also su!cient. In our analysis we assume that our necessary conditions are also su!-
cient.
82.3 The steady-state distortion
Since status-seeking individuals overvalue consumption, their willingness
to exert eort in order to achieve additional consumption is higher than
the e!cient level. As a result, for any given stock of the natural resources
competitive agents choose levels of consumption and eo r ta b o v et h ee !cient
levels chosen by the central planner. First, comparing (6) and (8), it is clear
that the steady-state level of the stock of resources, and therefore steady-
state consumption, achieved in the decentralized solution coincides with the
e!cient solution if and only if either eort is costless (i.e., XO =0 )o rt h e
stock does not enter the harvest function (i.e., OV =0 ). Second, assuming
that the resource stock enters the harvesting function, under costly eort,
we compare the decentralized steady state with the e!cient steady state














"), where the subscript 4 denotes steady-state values. Our
results, proved in the Appendix, conclude that the laissez-faire steady-state
stock of resources, Vg
", is lower than the e!cient level, Vs
". It follows from the
steady-state versions of (2) and (6) that deviations in the stock of resources
imply deviations in consumption and eort. Our ﬁndings are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1
(i) In a decentralized economy where (a) either eort is costless, or (b)
the harvest function is independent of the stock, the steady-state stock of
resources and consumption are e!cient.
(ii) In a decentralized economy where eort is endogenous (XO ? 0)a n d
the eort requirement function is decreasing in the stock (OV ? 0)> the steady-
state stock of resources is lower than the e!cient stock chosen by a central
planner. If J0(Vg
") ? 0 (i.e., Vg
" is greater than the maximum sustainable
yield stock), the laissez-faire outcome is associated with over-consumption
in the steady state and an ine!ciently high level of eort. If J0(Vg
") A 0
the laissez-faire outcome is associated with an ine!ciently low level of
9steady-state consumption and its eects on steady-state eort is ambigu-
ous.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Intuitively, relative consumption concerns trigger a process of excessive
extraction of the natural resource. If at the steady state, the stock of re-
sources is relatively abundant, i.e., its reproduction rate is locally decreasing
in the stock, over-consumption can be maintained but only at the expense
of an ine!ciently high level of eort. On the other hand, if the steady-state
stock of resources is low, i.e., its reproduction rate is locally increasing in
the stock, then the laissez-faire solution provides a permanently lower level











V with   0 and 1    0
where
0  ??1 and 1    A0
Here  is an indicator of status-consciousness.
Then the planner’s choices satisfy the condition

˙ Vs
Vs  ( + )
˙ fs
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10Thus, if A0 and A0,w ec a ns e et h a tVg
" ?V s
" given that A0.T h e
greater is , the smaller is the steady state stock under laissez-faire.
If we speciﬁy, in addition, that
J(V)=DV
  V where DA0, 0 ??1 and A0






and one can verify that the steady-state stock under laissez-faire exceeds VP
if and only if
(1  ) A  (1     + )=
2.4 The dynamic distortion
The dynamic distortion arises when concerns for relative consumption
cause a deviation of the private willingness to shift consumption through
time from the e!cient rate of change of consumption chosen by a central
planner. Dierentiating (5) and combining the result with (6), along a sym-
metric equilibrium where f = F, we obtain the following system of dierential
equations for the decentralized solution,
˙ fg [X11 + X12 + X1OOf +( XO1 + XO2 + XOOOf)Of + XOOff]
X1 + XOOf
+ ˙ Vg [X1OOV + XOOOVOf + XOOfV]
X1 + XOOf










Proceeding similarly with (7) and (8) we obtain the following pair of dier-
ential equations for the e!cient solution
˙ fs [X11 +2 X12 + X1OOf + X2OOf + X22 +( XO1 + XO2 + XOOOf)Of + XOOff]
X1 + X2 + XOOf
+
˙ Vs [X1OOV + X2OOV + XOOOVOf + XOOfV]
X1 + X2 + XOOf










By deﬁnition, the dynamic distortion is limited to the transitional path and
therefore it is better illustrated using a simpler variant of the model where
relative consumption does not introduce steady-state distortions. From Pro-
position 1, both steady states coincide if O(f>V)=O(f),a n df o rt h es a k eo f
exposition we shall make this assumption throughout Section 2.4. Then the
transitional path of the competitive solution is e!cient if and only if




X11 +2 X12 + X1OOf + X2OOf + X22 +( XO1 + XO2 + XOOOf)Of + XOOff
X1 + X2 + XOOf
At this stage is convenient to deﬁne the following function
Y (f>F)  X(f>F>O(f)) (14)
Proposition 2: There are no dynamic distortions if and only if the func-
tion Y (f>F) displays “scale-independent” marginal rate of substitution along




where n is a constant (independent of {).




Y11 + Y12 +( Y21 + Y22)
Y1 + Y2
where all derivatives are evaluated at (f>F)=( {>{), for any {A0.T h i s
equality holds if and only if







































Under exogenous eort, this condition reduces to the result presented by



























This function is concave and homogeneous of degree (1)(1) in (f>F).
Thus the marginal rate of substitution is constant along any ray through the

















4We refer our readers to Turnovsky and Liu (2004) for an extensive analysis of the











Y (f>F) is not homogeneous in (f>F), and the marginal rate of substitution
is not constant along the 45 degree line f = F, so consumption externalities
distort the transition.
2.5 Optimal ﬁscal policy
In the presence of consumption externalities the decentralized allocation
of resources is not Pareto e!cient. We now show that the government can
restore e!ciency by means of corrective taxation. Consider the decentralized
economy described in sub-section 2.2, with a government that imposes a
time varying tax,  (w), on resource extraction. The government is assumed
to run a balanced budget, returning at each instant in time the amount raised
through taxes as a lump sum transfer, W (w). Under this government tax and
transfer program, the individual, taking W as given, perceives the following
relationship between her level of extraction and her consumption
f =( 1 )| + W
i.e. she takes it that
gf@g| =1 
T h ec o n s u m e rc h o o s e st h et i m ep a t h|u, where the superscript u denotes














The necessary conditions for the representative consumer are









(1  )X1 + XOO|
(17)












































(1  )X1 + XOO|
(19)






























Substituting (20) and (21) into (19), we obtain the following dierential equa-
tion that together with (15) describes the dynamics of the competitive solu-















X1 + X2 + XOO|




X1 + X2 + XOO|
This equation coincides with (11) and therefore achieves the social optimum.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Along a symmetric path, f = F> the e!cient equilibrium





In general  will be time-varying along the transitional path converging to a
positive constant at the steady state.
153C a l i b r a t i n g t h e e ects of the externality
Consider an economy populated by a representative individual endowed












where A0,  6=1 ,  > 0>+ (  1) A 0, A0 and (  1)  1 A 0 .
Multiplicative relative consumption has been widely used in the asset pricing
literature, Abel (1990) and Gali (1994), growth literature, Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2004), and experimental literature, Solnick and Hemenway (1998). In

















subject to (2) and V(0) = V0. Evaluating the optimality conditions along a





3(1+)31Of  # =0 (22)











with (1  )    1, (1  )    1 and 0 ??1. Our harvesting
function nests the popular Schaefer harvesting function, where  =  =1
(Schaefer (1957), Brander and Taylor (1998)) and the constant returns to
5Our numerical results are based on a reproduction function strictly increasing in the
resource stock. Although this speciﬁcation is more restrictive than our previous analytical
results, we believe that in the resource extraction context the increasing range of this
function is the empirically relevant one.
16scale Cobb-Douglas function, where + =1(Brown (1974), Smith (1975))
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Combining (26), (27), (25) and (2) we get a system of two dierential equa-
tions that together with the initial stock of resources and the transversality
condition fully describes the dynamic behavior of our model. In the unique
















It is straightforward to show that the steady-state stock of natural resources,
Vg
", is decreasing in the importance of relative consumption captured by .
Furthermore if eort is costless (i.e.,  =0 )the steady-state level of the
natural resource is not aected by relative consumption concerns. Finally it
is worth noticing that the e!cient steady state satisﬁes (28) with  =0and





We calibrate our model to illustrate the quantitative eects of relative
consumption in the steady-state stock of resources, consumption, eort and
welfare. Our measure of the welfare cost of the distortion is standard: we
denote by * the percentage increase in individual (and average) steady-state
consumption that an agent living in the competitive world must receive in
order to enjoy the same welfare level as that of an agent living in the steady
state of the planned economy7. In our benchmark calibration, we set our
6In order to ensure that the planner’s optimization problem is strictly concave in f we
impose the restriction @ ? 1.















gw, the corresponding measure for the de-




















p ((1 + *)fs
4>O p
4).
17extraction parameters  =  =0 =5, the stock elasticity of the reproduction
function  = =5, the rate of time preference  =0 =02 and the parameter
that governs the disutility of eort  =0 =2. Since we restrict our analysis
to steady-state outcomes our results are independent of the value of =Direct
evidence on the importance of relative consumption, captured by ,i ss p a r s e .
The literature on the equity premium puzzle suggests that only relative con-
sumption matters; see Abel (1990), Gali (1994) and Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). Easterlin (1995) and Frey and Stutzer (2002) evaluate the time series
and cross-sectional properties of several measures of self-reported happiness.
Their ﬁndings are consistent with preference speciﬁcations that again place
most of the weight on relative consumption. Alpizar et al. (2005) conduct
several experiments to assess the importance of relative consumption. In the
case of cars and housing their median estimate for the weight of relative
consumption lies between 0.5 and 0.75. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Sutthiphisal
(2007), using individual consumption data, estimates a weight of relative
consumption close to one third. In view of these estimates, we choose a con-
servative value,  =1, for the benchmark calibration and conduct extensive
sensitivity analysis based on the range of reported estimates.
As reported in Table 1, at the steady state of our benchmark calibration
(in bold numerals), the competitive stock of resources is less than two thirds
of the e!cient stock. As a result, there is a shortfall in consumption equal
to one fourth of the e!cient level. Since under our benchmark parameter
values steady-state eort is not distorted, this lower level of consumption is
associated with a welfare cost, expressed in units of permanent consumption,
equal to one third of the competitive level of consumption. Table 1 presents
some robustness checks for our benchmark results. As we increase the weight
of relative consumption (i.e., @(1+)) from zero to more than nine tenths,
the competitive stock of resources falls to slightly more than one third of the
Admittedly, * overstates the true welfare cost since it ignores the welfare eects along
the transition. Nontheless given the size of the welfare costs associated with the steady
state distortion we believe our measure is a good proxy for the overall welfare costs of the
distortion from any set of initial conditions. See Alvarez-Cuadrado (2007) for an analysis
of the welfare costs along the transitional path in the context of a growing economy.
18e!cient stock. The diminishing returns in the resource reproduction function
limit the drop in consumption that remains close to two thirds of the e!cient
level, but despite of this the associated welfare costs, as a result of diminishing
marginal utility, almost double relative to our benchmark calibration. Since
relative consumption concerns aect the steady-state allocation of resources
through the trade-o between consumption and eort, the distortion is very
sensitive to changes in .A se ort becomes more costly,  =0 =4> the planner
reduces both consumption and eort to reach a steady state with a relatively
high stock of resources. Since competitive agents overvalue consumption they
exert an ine!ciently high level of eort that eventually runs the stock of
resources down to only one tenth of the e!cient level. The associated welfare
costs are huge, equivalent to a consumption loss three times as large as the
steady state laissez faire level. As we change de elasticity of the extraction
function to the resource stock, , a similar eect arises but now it even
distorts the steady state allocation of eort. When eort is a major ingredient
in the extraction process,  =0 =3, the planner chooses relatively high levels
of eort, even higher than the market in steady state, and the distortion
only reduces the laissez faire stock of resources by one ﬁfth with an associated
w e l f a r ec o s ts l i g h t l ya b o v eo n et e n t h .O nt h eo t h e rh a n da st h ew e i g h to fe ort
on extraction decreases, the market reduces the amount of eort exerted at
a slower rate than the e!cient pace. As a result, when  =0 =7,c o m p e t i t i v e
agents exert almost three times more eo r tt h a nt h et h ee !cient level and
reduce the e!cient stock of resources by four ﬁfths, again the welfare losses
associated with this process of over-extraction are tremendous.
The steady-state results for the Schaefer extraction function are presen-
ted in Table 2. Under our benchmark calibration, the competitive stock of
resources is only two thirds of the e!cient stock, consumption only four ﬁfths
and the laissez-faire level of eort exceeds the e!cient level by approximately
one quarter. This combination of lower consumption and higher eort is as-
sociated with a welfare cost slightly below one third of the laissez-faire level
of consumption. As in the constant returns to scale case, increases in the
19weight of relative consumption, , or increases on the disutility of eort, ,
exacerbate the eects of the distortion and its welfare costs.
Table 1.Steady-state distortion for dierent parameter conﬁgurations.
Constant returns to scale extraction technology
 =0 =5;  =0 =2
 =0  =0 =5  =1  =5  =1 0
Resource Stock 0% -33% -44% -59% -61%
Consumption 0% -18% -25% -36% -38%
Eort 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Welfare 0% 22% 33% 56% 61%
 =0 =5;  =1
 =0  =0 =1  =0 =3  =0 =4
Resource Stock 0% -21% -67% -89%
Consumption 0% -11% -43% -67%
Eort 0% 0% 0% 0%
Welfare 0% 13% 75% 200%
 =0 =2;  =1
 =0 =3  =0 =4  =0 =6  =0 =7
Resource Stock -21% -31% -60% -80%
Consumption -11% -17% -36% -55%
Eort -7% -6% 25% 192%
Welfare 11% 19% 64% 177%
Table 2.Steady-state distortion for dierent parameter conﬁgurations.
Schaefer extraction technology
 =0 =2
 =0  =0 =5  =1  =5  =1 0
Resource Stock 0% -24% -34% -49% -52%
Consumption 0% -13% -19% -29% -36%
Eort 0% 15% 23% 40% 45%
Welfare 0% 18% 28% 50% 56%
20 =1
 =0  =0 =1  =0 =3  =0 =4
Resource Stock 0% -18% -47% -59%
Consumption 0% -10% -27% -36%
Eort 0% 11% 37% 56%
Welfare 0% 12% 51% 86%
4 Additional results with consumption ex-
ternalities
4.1 A model with amenity values
In addition to being consumption goods or production inputs, some nat-
ural resources generate a variety of amenity services that include, for instance,
the recreational and aesthetic values associated with a well-preserved envir-
onment8. Following Krautkraemer (1985) we assume that the owner of a
resource stock not only earns income from extraction, but also enjoys other
amenities from the preservation of the stock. To capture this idea, we adopt




















4 ?$?1, 0 ??1 and 0 ? 1
Here, in order to focus on the role of amenities, we assume that extraction
does not require eort:




(1+)$ +( 1 )V
$
8The experimental literature on relative consumption highlights important dierences
in the degree of comparison among dierent consumption goods. In general, easily observ-
able goods or services, such as housing or cars, are subject to stronger externalities than
unobservable ones, such as medical insurance or leisure. In line with this evidence, we
make the extreme assumption that interpersonal comparisons do not involve comparing
the amenity services provided by the stock of natural resources.
21In a decentralized setting the representative individual chooses the path of
f to maximize the intertemporal value of (29) subject to (2) and V(0) = V0.
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together with (2) and the transversality condition, lim
w<"#Vh3w =0 .D i er-
entiating (30) with respect to time and combining the result with (30) and
(31), we obtain the following dierential equation
˙ #
#




A symmetric steady state is reached when F = f = J(V") and ˙ # =0and










It is straightforward to show that the steady-state stock of natural resources,
V", is unique. Furthermore, increases in the importance of relative consump-
tion, captured by , decrease the steady-state stock of resources. Intuititively
increases in the importance of relative consumption increase the willingness
of the competitive agent to increase extraction at the cost of lowering the
amenity services provided by the unexploited resource. This process of over-
extraction is associated with a lower steady-state stock of the natural re-
source. Finally, it is worth noticing that the e!cient stock of resources is
given by (32) with  =0and therefore is always larger than the laissez-faire
solution.
4.2 A model with extinction of privately-owned re-
source stocks
So far we have assumed that all consumption goods come from resource
extraction. It follows that, if the marginal utility of consumption, evaluated
22at f =0 , is inﬁnite, then given our assumption that each agent has perfect
property rights over her own resource stock it is not possible that the market
outcome, with agents maximizing over an inﬁnite horizon, will result in the
extinction of the resource.9
We now show that if the marginal utility of consumption from harvested
resources, evaluated at f =0 , is ﬁnite, then under certain parameter values,
the social planner would want to maintain a positive stock level, but the
market outcome results in extinction, even though each individual has full
control of her own resource stock.
Assume the utility function is a function of a basic good {,a n dar e s o u r c e
good (e.g. timber furniture), the consumption of which is denoted by f.W e
posit in the case where envy applies only to the consumption of the resource







where y({) is a concave and increasing function, and
0 ???1> 0 ? 1+  ?1
The harvesting function is | = OV, and as before the resource havested is












Assume that at each point of time, each agent is endowed with a ﬁxed ﬂow
{A0 of a non-storable basic good, so her consumption of this good is equal
to {.
9Of course with common property resources, extinction is a deﬁnite possibility even
if the marginal utility of consumption at zero consumption is inﬁnite. For a model with
extinction under the regime of common-property resources, see Dutta and Rowat (2006).
23Assume J(V) is strictly concave, with J(0) = 0 = J(V) for some VA0.







We shall prove the following:
Proposition 4: Assume that the parameter values satisfy the following
inequalities








0(0)) A 0 (34)
Then under laissez-faire, there exists no positive steady-state stock, while the
social planner’s problem has a unique positive steady-state stock level.
Proof:
(i) Market outcome (extinction):
In a decentralized setting the representative individual chooses the path
of f,t a k i n gF as given, to maximize the intertemporal value of (33) subject
to (2) and V(0) = V0. The necessary conditions for this program are10
F3V(1 +   )f3
1+f+13F3V  # =0








Then we have the following system










10The second order condition is satisﬁed because   A0.
24˙ V(w)=J(V(w))  }(w)V(w)
Assume AJ 0(0) . Then it is easy to verify that the following triple is a
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Furthermore, let us show there are no steady states with a positive stock.
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But, from assumption (34) and the strict concavity of J(V),f o ra l lVA0>
the following inequalities hold:











It follows that there is no b VA0 that satisﬁes condition (35).
(ii) Social planner (non-extinction):
The social planner internalizes the negative impact of individual consump-
tion, f, on average consumption, F, and therefore the optimality conditions
for his program, where } = f@V,a r e
(1  )}3
1+V}13 = #













25T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 3 6 )s t a r t s ,w h e nV =0 ,a tJ0(0) and falls as V rises,
and eventually becomes negative. The left-hand side starts at (J0(0))(1





exists if (  J0(0))(1  )@ ? J0(0).
5 Conclusions
The negative welfare consequences of competitive consumption have
been long noted by social and natural scientists. In the words of the evolu-
tionary biologist Richard Dawkins (1986, p.184):
Why, for instance, are trees in the forest so tall? The short
answer is that all the other trees are tall, so no one tree can
aord not to be. It would be overshadowed if it did... But if only
they were all shorter, if only there could be some sort of trade-
union agreement to lower the recognized height of the canopy in
forests, all the trees would beneﬁt. They would be competing with
each other in the canopy for exactly the same sun light, but they
would all have "paid" much smaller growing costs to get into the
canopy.
Only recently has the economic profession begun to pay closer attention to
the welfare consequences of consumption externalities. In this paper we have
presented a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are deﬁned
over the individual’s consumption level, her eo r ta n dt h ec o m p a r i s o no fh e r
consumption with that of other members of the community. Our speciﬁcation
captures the intuition that lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence
that places interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of well-being. We
ﬁnd that envious individuals ignore the negative eects that their extraction
choices impose on the welfare of their neighbors; as a result they over-exploit
the natural resource, resulting in an ine!ciently low steady-state stock.
We have identiﬁed two dimensions along which consumption externalities
distort the e!cient extraction of resources. In the case where eort is endo-
26genous, envy distorts the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and eort, the static/steady state distortion.E v e nw h e ne ort is costless,
consumption externalities might distort the willingness to shift consumption
through time and therefore the path of extraction displays a dynamic distor-
tion. These distortions provide a new rationale for the increasing concerns
about over-exploitation of resources, possible extinction, and the general de-
terioration of the environment caused by human activities. Our results high-
light an important scope for government intervention even in the absence
of the externalities associated with common property arrangements. In a
world where agents envy the consumption of their neighbors, an appropri-
ately chosen harvesting tax must be imposed to induce the preservation of
the natural resource and improve welfare.
Our results can be extended along several dimensions. In future work, we
aim to fully explore the transitional dynamics of our model. A similar exercise
could be conducted under the more plausible scenario of common-property
resources. We anticipate that the negative eects associated with consump-
tion externalities will exacerbate the problems caused by the “tragedy of
commons”.
27APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
The symmetric competitive solution satisﬁes the following conditions
X1 (f>f>O(f>V)) + XOOf  # =0
˙ # = #[  J
0(V)]  XO(f>f>O(f>V))OV (f>V)
˙ V = J(V)  f









, satisfy the following system of equations
X1 (f>f>O(f>V)) + XOOf  # =0
#[  J
0(V)]  XO (f>f>O(f>V))OV (f>V)=0
J(V)  f =0
The social planner’s solution satisﬁes the following conditions
X1 (f>f>O(f>V)) + X2 (f>f>O(f>V)) + XOOf  # =0
˙ # = #[  J
0(V)]  XO(f>f>O(f>V))OV (f>V)
˙ V = J(V)  f





"), satisfy the following system of equations
X1 (f>f>O(f>V)) + X2 (f>f>O(f>V)) + XOOf  # =0
#[  J
0(V)]  XO (f>f>O(f>V))OV (f>V)=0
J(V)  f =0
We assume that the planner’s steady state has the usual saddlepoint property.













P r o o fo fP a r t( i ) :Assume either XO =0or OV =0 . Then the steady-
state stock satisﬁes J0(V)= under the social planner, and also under the
28laissez-faire regime. Since J(V) is strictly concave, this condition implies
Vs
" = Vg
". This in turn implies fs
" = fg
".
P r o o fo fP a r t( i i ) :Assume that XO A 0 and OV ? 0. Then, since the
shadow price # is positive, at the steady state   J0(V)=XOOV A 0.W e
now show that this implies Vg
" ?V s
".











(1)(f>#>V>!)  X1 (f>f>O(f>V)) + (1  !)X2 (f>f>O(f>V)) + XOOf  #
M
(2)(f>#>V>!)  #[  J
0(V)]  XO(f>f>O(f>V))OV (f>V)
M
(3)(f>#>V>!)  J(V)  f
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29Let G denote the determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side. It can be












This shows that the market outcome results in a lower steady-state stock












This expression is positive i J0(Vs
") A 0.
Lemma 1: Consider any autonomous optimal control problem with one
state variable, f, and one control variable, V. Assume the Hamiltonian is
concave in (f>V), and strictly concave in f> and the existence of a steady
state that displays saddlepoint stability. Let G be the determinant of the
3 × 3 matrix 5
7
Kff Kf# KfV




evaluated at that steady state. Then GA0.
Proof: (Not intended for publication).
Let us deﬁne
y(f>V)  X(f>f>O(f>V))






˙ V = I(f>V)




30We get a system of 3 equations
Kf(f>#>V)=yf + #If =0
˙ # = #  KV(f>#>V)
˙ V = K#(f>#>V)




Consider the maximized Hamiltonian
K(#>V)=m a x
f K(f>#>V)
Then we get a system of two equations
˙ # = #  KV(#>V)
˙ V = K#(#>V)
Let (#">V ") be a steady state of this system. Linearizing around (#">V ")

















Assume saddlepoint stability, so that one root is positive and one root is
negative. Then { ? 0 because { is equal to the product of the two roots.




K## = K## + K#f
Cf
C#






= KVV  KVf
KfV
Kff
KV# = KV# + KVf
Cf
C#
= KV#  KVf
Kf#
Kff








Let G be the determinant of this matrix. Evaluating this determinant by
expanding along the second row, it is easy to verify that
KffG =( Kff)
2 {
It follows that GA0.T h i sc o n c l u d e st h ep r o o fo ft h eL e m m a .
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